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The Vegetative State and the
Science of Consciousness*
Nicholas Shea and Tim Bayne
ABSTRACT
Consciousness in experimental subjects is typically inferred from reports and other
forms of voluntary behaviour. A wealth of everyday experience conﬁrms that healthy
subjects do not ordinarily behave in these ways unless they are conscious. Investigation
of consciousness in vegetative state patients has been based on the search for neural
evidence that such broad functional capacities are preserved in some vegetative state
patients. We call this the standard approach. To date, the results of the standard ap-
proach have suggested that some vegetative state patients might indeed be conscious,
although they fall short of being demonstrative. The fact that some vegetative state
patients show evidence of consciousness according to the standard approach is remark-
able, for the standard approach to consciousness is rather conservative, and leaves open
the pressing question of how to ascertain whether patients who fail such tests are con-
scious or not. We argue for a cluster-based ‘natural kind’methodology that is adequate
to that task, both as a replacement for the approach that currently informs research
into the presence or absence of consciousness in vegetative state patients and as a meth-
odology for the science of consciousness more generally.
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1 Introduction
The questions of when and on what basis we should ascribe consciousness to
others are two of the most vexing questions in the philosophy of mind and in
the science of consciousness. In this paper, we focus on these questions as they
manifest themselves in the context of patients in the vegetative state (vegetative
state). Such patients have traditionally been assumed to lack consciousness,
but a series of recent experiments has put that assumption in doubt. This paper
examines the methodological assumptions behind those experiments, with a
focus on the question of what it would take to discover evidence of conscious-
ness (or its absence) in vegetative state patients. Current approaches to the
study of consciousness in vegetative state—and, indeed, to the study of con-
sciousness in general—are dominated by what we will call the ‘standard
approach’. Proponents of this approach look for evidence that behavioural
capacities that are pre-theoretically associated with consciousness—such as
report and voluntary action—remain intact in vegetative state. In the ﬁrst half
of this paper, we draw on the standard approach, arguing that it provides a
powerful but less than demonstrative case for thinking that at least some veg-
etative state patients are conscious. We then turn to the merits of the standard
approach itself, arguing that there is a more attractive alternative to it. This
alternative approach—which we call the ‘natural kind methodology’—
involves investigating whether consciousness is a natural kind. If it is, then
we can study it in ways that go beyond the standard approach.
2 The Vegetative State
After a brain injury caused by trauma or hypoxia, patients may emerge from
coma and enter the vegetative state (Bernat [2006]; Jennett [2002]; Plum and
Posner [1982]; Schiff [2007]). Unlike coma patients, vegetative state patients
show a normal sleep–wake cycle, opening their eyes when awake and making
roving eye movements. The crucial clinical signs of vegetative state are neg-
ative: there should be no evidence of awareness of self or the environment, no
responses to external stimuli of a kind that would suggest volition or purpose
(as opposed to reﬂexes), and no evidence of language expression or compre-
hension (Royal College of Physicians [2003], Section 2.2). A vegetative state is
classiﬁed as permanent once there is no chance of the patient recovering from
it: twelve months after a coma caused by a traumatic brain injury or six
months after a coma caused by non-traumatic brain injury (e.g., hypoxia).
Patients recovering from a brain injury often pass through vegetative state
for a short time when emerging from a coma before reaching full conscious-
ness. Other patients remain in the vegetative state for a longer time whilst
retaining some chance of recovery. Although not a recognised diagnostic cat-
egory, this state is commonly referred to as the ‘persistent vegetative state’.
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Might (some) vegetative state patients be conscious? The type of conscious-
ness we have in mind here is phenomenal consciousness: the sort of
consciousness that there is something that it is like to enjoy, from the subject’s
point of view (Nagel [1974]). One might think that the answer to this question
must be ‘no’. After all, vegetative state is commonly said to be a state of ‘wake-
ful unconsciousness’. Furthermore, clinicians distinguish the vegetative state
from the minimally conscious state (MCS),1 a distinction that seems to presup-
pose that vegetative state patients are not conscious in any way. If vegetative
state were characterised directly by reference to the absence of consciousness,
any reason for thinking that an apparently vegetative state patient was con-
scious would be evidence that the patient was not in fact in vegetative state.
That is not, however, how the clinical deﬁnition works. Clinicians use a set
of agreed guidelines that tie diagnosis to a number of factors, and it remains
an open epistemic possibility that patients who meet the guidelines in question
might be conscious. We will leave to one side the question of whether patients
who meet the current diagnosis of vegetative state but also show signs of con-
sciousness should receive their own diagnostic category (Fins and Schiff
[2006]). Our main concern here is not taxonomy but the deeper issue of whether
the patients in question—however described—might be conscious.
Of course, not all open possibilities are live possibilities. Are there positive
reasons for thinking that some vegetative state patients might actually be con-
scious? There are—but ﬁrst some background.
Recent studies show that metabolic activity in the brains of vegetative state
patients is typically 40% that of neurologically intact individuals. This is com-
parable to the activity in the brains of healthy individuals under general
anaesthetic and quite unlike ‘brain dead’ patients who have no metabolic neu-
ral activity (measured by positron emission tomography, PET). Other studies
have shown preservation of some level of differentiated cortical activity in cer-
tain vegetative state patients (e.g., islands of activity in resting state; Schiff et
al. [2002]), including in response to a story being read by a relative (PET: de
Jong et al. [1997]), the sound of the patient’s own name (functional magnetic
resonance imaging, fMRI: Staffen et al. [2006]; Di et al. [2007]; electroenceph-
alogram, EEG: Perrin et al. [2006]), pictures of familiar faces (PET: Menon et
al. [1998]), and painful stimuli (fMRI: Laureys et al. [2002]).
Although suggestive, these results have little direct bearing on the question
of consciousness, for brain activation of this kind is routinely found in the
context of unconscious cognitive processing (such as priming). More persua-
sive are the results reported by Owen et al. ([2005]) and Coleman et al. ([2007])
who found that vegetative state patients show PET and fMRI responses to
speech (contrasted with acoustically matched noise) that correspond to those
1 (Royal College of Physicians [2003], Section 2.5).
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found in normal subjects, albeit at reduced overall levels of activation. Even
more tantalisingly, fMRI studies have found evidence of semantic processing
of ambiguous words in vegetative state patients. When normal subjects hear
potentially ambiguous sentences,2 as compared to low-ambiguity sentences,
they show higher activation of a well-characterised language network involv-
ing the superior and middle temporal gyrii and the left inferior frontal gyrus
(Rodd et al. [2005]). A few vegetative state patients also show activation of
this network in response to high-ambiguity but not low-ambiguity sentences.3
Strikingly, this differential response is abolished by even moderate levels of
anaesthetic sedation in healthy volunteers (Davis et al. [2007]).
To date, the strongest published evidence for consciousness in the vegetative
state derives from an fMRI study of a twenty-three-year-old female victim of a
car accident who had been in a vegetative state for ﬁve months (Owen et al.
[2006]).4 The study involved two kinds of trials. On some trials, the patient
was played a pre-recorded instruction to imagine playing tennis; on other trials,
she was instructed to imagine visiting the rooms of her home. In each case, after
thirty seconds, she was told to relax (‘now just relax’) and given a thirty-second
rest period. In this paradigm, the blood oxygen level-dependent (BOLD) signal
from those brain areas preferentially involved in motor imagery and spatial
navigation in the two conditions (compared with rest) was indistinguishable
from that seen in 34 healthy volunteers: the instruction to imagine playing ten-
nis produced increased activation in the supplementary motor area (SMA) in
both control subjects and the patient, and the instruction to imagine walking
around the home produced increased activation in the ‘parahippocampal place
area’ (PPA)—parahippocampal gyrus, posterior parietal lobe, and the lateral
premotor cortex—in both controls and the patient (Boly et al. [2007]; Owen
et al. [2006]). This activation is consistent with the results of numerous imaging
studies of motor imagery and spatial navigation. Similar activations have been
found in a small number of other vegetative state patients (Owen and Coleman
[2008a], [2008b]). The authors draw the following conclusion:
These results conﬁrm that […] this patient retained the ability to under-
stand spoken commands and to respond to them through brain activity,
rather than through speech or movement. Moreover, her decision to co-
operate with the authors by imagining particular tasks when asked to do
so represents a clear act of intention, which conﬁrmed beyond any doubt
that she was consciously aware of herself and her surroundings. (Owen et
al. [2006], p. 1402)
2 For example ‘The creek/creak came from a beam in the ceiling’. Typical subjects assume the
ﬁrst meaning, creek, until they reach ‘beam’, leading them to reinterpret the term as creak.
3 Out of 17 vegetative state patients, three showed greater activation of this network to high am-
biguity sentences (Owen et al. [2005], [2006]; Coleman et al. [2007]; Owen and Coleman [2008a]).
4 The patient in question was in a persistent vegetative state, and it is not yet known whether
similar results can be found in permanent vegetative state patients.
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One might well take issue with the phrase ‘beyond any doubt’, but these
results are certainly striking. Our aim in the following section is to examine
just how strong the case for consciousness in this patient is.
Before we turn to that task, two important points must bemade. Firstly, even
if this patient is conscious, the nature of her consciousness is likely to be abnor-
mal in fundamental ways. Vegetative state patients have suffered serious global
brain damage; many fail to regain consciousness at all, and even those who do
remain very signiﬁcantly mentally impaired. For this reason, and because they
have suffered from memory impairments, it is not surprising that there are no
accounts from recovered vegetative state patients that report in a veriﬁable way
on what it was like to have been conscious whilst in the vegetative state. We
should resist the temptation to think of consciousness in the vegetative state
on the model of consciousness in locked-in patients who, despite having had
a focal brain lesion that leaves them almost incapable of motor activity, enjoy
a rich conscious life that they are able to describe by means of simple motor
actions such as eye blinks. Any consciousness that might occur in vegetative
state is likely to be extremely fragmented, not dissimilar, perhaps, to the kind
of consciousness seen in delirium and dreaming (Zeman [2002]). Indeed, it is
possible that consciousness comes in degrees and that certain patients lie in
the penumbra between full consciousness and its absence.
The second point concerns what we might call the problem of error man-
agement. Two kinds of error are possible when it comes to the ascription of
consciousness. Errors of commission involve judging an unconscious organism
to be conscious; errors of omission involve judging a conscious organism to be
unconscious. Of necessity, the task of formulating and applying criteria for the
ascription of consciousness must take into account the relative costs of these
two forms of error. Those who regard errors of omission as more grave than
errors of commission will lean towards a liberal approach to the ascription of
consciousness, whereas those who hold the opposite view will be motivated to
adopt a conservative approach to the ascription of consciousness. Arguably,
the task of balancing off these two kinds of error against each other is not a
purely scientiﬁc one but requires attention to complex and contested ethical
questions. We will not engage in that task here, but it should be borne in mind
in what follows.
3 The Standard Approach
According to what we will call ‘the standard approach’, the ascription of con-
sciousness in contested cases such as vegetative state should be governed
solely by those pre-theoretical markers that we use to ascribe consciousness
to each other, namely, reportability and various forms of voluntary behav-
iour. The standard approach requires interpreting the neuroimaging data in
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terms of either reportability or volition in order for it to support the ascrip-
tion of consciousness. We consider ﬁrst the argument from reportability
before turning to the argument from volition.
In appealing to report as a measure of consciousness, most theorists appear
to have ‘introspective report’—that is, reports of one’s current experiential
states—in mind. It seems clear that the patient did not produce introspective
reports. Another form of report that is also—and indeed, more typically—
used as a measure of consciousness is ‘environmental report’: a report of one’s
current environment (or bodily state). But there is no evidence that the patient
produced environmental reports either. So, if we were to take reportability as
our ‘gold standard’ for the ascription of consciousness, then we would be led
to conclude that the patient was not conscious—or at least that we have no
evidence of her being conscious.5
But perhaps we have been too hasty. Granted that the patient did not pro-
duce any reports, perhaps we have evidence that she was capable of producing
reports. In a recent experiment, Owen and colleagues showed that healthy vo-
lunteers could communicate via mental imagery that is read by real-time fMRI;
in principle, it would be possible to employ this paradigm to communicate with
patients (Owen et al. [2006], [2007b]; Monti et al. [2009]). If a vegetative state
patient were able to use this paradigm to communicate reliably, for example by
correctly answering a range of biographical questions, then that would show
beyond reasonable doubt that they were conscious. The patient in (Owen et
al. [2006]) didn’t use this paradigm to communicate, but one might argue that
the imagery result demonstrates that she could have communicated in this way
and that the reportability condition could thereby be said to be satisﬁed.
There is certainly some daylight between ‘being able to issue a report here
and now’ and ‘being able to issue reports’ in the sense in which the reportabil-
ity criterion requires. A locked-in syndrome patient whose one good eye
muscle has been temporally paralysed won’t be able to issue a report right
now, but there is still a very natural sense in which such a patient retains
the ability to produce reports. So, the fact that the patient in Owen’s study
didn’t produce any reports does not demonstrate that she lacked the capacity
to produce reports. Nonetheless, we do not have any reason to think that this
patient retained the ability to produce reports. Normal subjects can use mental
imagery that is read by real-time fMRI to communicate, but we have no evi-
dence that this patient retained this ability. Our initial assessment was correct: a
reportability-based argument will not support the claim that the patient de-
scribed in the Owen study is conscious.
Just where this leaves us depends on how the connection between report-
ability and consciousness is to be understood. Taking reportability as only one
5 Here, we depart from Owen et al. ([2006]) who suggest that the patient did produce reports.
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ground on which to ascribe consciousness leaves open the case for conscious-
ness in this patient. But if we suppose that our only access to consciousness is
via reportability, then we will have to conclude that we have no evidence that
this patient is conscious—indeed, we might have to conclude that the evidence
favours the view that the patient is unconscious.
Is reportability the sole measure of consciousness? A number of theorists
have claimed that it is. In a commentary on (Owen et al. [2006]), Naccache
states that ‘consciousness is univocally probed in humans through the sub-
ject’s report of his or her own mental states’. Nacccache went on to claim
that the Owen et al. study was ‘not totally convincing on the issue of con-
sciousness’ (Naccache [2006], p. 1396), presumably on the grounds that the
patient didn’t produce a report of her own mental states. Naccache is far from
being alone in claiming that reportability—in particular, introspective report-
ability—is the unique measure of consciousness (see Papineau [2002], p. 182;
Frith et al. [1999], p. 107; Weiskrantz [1997], p. 84).
The problem with this line of thought is that we routinely ascribe conscious-
ness to subjects who are incapable of producing environmental reports let
alone introspective reports. Although there are some who are reluctant to as-
cribe (phenomenal) consciousness to pre-verbal children and non-linguistic
animals, such theorists are clearly in the minority. Pre-verbal creatures might
lack self-consciousness, but there is little intuitive support for the thought that
they are altogether unconscious. Even when it comes to adult, neurologically
intact human beings, there is reason to think that reportability is not the only
measure we have of consciousness. Split-brain patients will usually deny see-
ing stimuli presented in their left visual ﬁeld, but they are able to employ
representations of the presented items in the service of rational agency. Fur-
thermore, unlike blindsighted subjects, split-brain subjects do not need to be
coaxed into using these representations—their use of them is spontaneous
(Sperry et al. [1979]; Seymour et al. [1994]; Zaidel et al. [2003]). This fact sug-
gests that these perceptual representations are conscious, even though the
patient is not able to draw on their contents for the purposes of report. In
sum, one can have good evidence of consciousness even when reportability
is not present.
This leads us to a second argument for thinking that the patient studied by
Owen and colleagues was conscious—an argument from volition. It does seem
plausible to suppose that the neural activity they found is evidence of inten-
tional agency. And, on the face of things, intentional agency seems to be a
good marker of consciousness (Dretske [2006]). Indeed, it is precisely the abil-
ity to perform intentional actions that leads clinicians to regard MCS patients
as conscious despite the fact that they cannot produce reports of any kind
(Giacino et al. [2002]). Let us call this the argument from volition.
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One line of objection to the argument from volition takes issue with the
claim that this patient was performing a volitional action. Some commentators
have objected that the data do not support a volitional interpretation on the
grounds that the imagery could be an automatic response to the stimuli
(Greenberg [2007]; Nachev and Husain [2007]). Just what to make of this ob-
jection depends in no small part on what is meant by ‘automatic’ here. One
form of automaticity occurs in the context of semantic priming. Could this ac-
count for the data that Owen and colleagues report? That seems highly unlikely
for the priming literature tells us that whole sentences are unable to function as
unconscious primes (Greenwald [1992]). Furthermore, Owen and colleagues
found that a healthy control showed no increased activity in SMA when he
heard the word ‘tennis’ in the context of the sentence ‘The man played tennis’
nor did he show any increased activity in PPA when he heard the word ‘house’
in the context of the sentence ‘The man walked around his house’ (Owen et al.
[2007a]).6 A further reason for thinking that the activation cannot be ac-
counted for in terms of semantic priming concerns its time course. Whereas
priming is typically short-lived—in the order of hundreds of milliseconds or
less—the activation found in this case persisted for a full thirty seconds (Owen
et al. [2007a]; although it is not clear that separate analyses were made of dif-
ferent parts of the thirty-second blocks). Such sustained activation is very
unlikely to be due to automatic processing in healthy subjects, although it can-
not be excluded that the temporal dynamics of the brains of vegetative state
patients differ signiﬁcantly from healthy controls in this respect.7 A still further
reason for rejecting the automaticity interpretation is that the areas of activa-
tion (SMA, PPA) are not associated with the semantic content of the words but
with acts of imagery (see Owen et al. [2007a]). So, if the neural activity is to be
understood in terms of automatic responses, the notion of automaticity in play
is much more likely to be that of automatic behaviour rather than that of au-
tomatic semantic activation.8 We examine such accounts of these data below.
Other commentators have objected to a volitional interpretation of the neu-
ral activity on less direct grounds. Naccache ([2006], p. 1396) asks, ‘Why
wouldn’t [the patient] be able to engage in intentional motor acts, given that
6 It would be useful to give similar tests to vegetative state patients: to record their response to
the instructions, indicative sentences involving the same words, the words ‘tennis’ and ‘house’
alone, etc.
7 Some evidence against this challenge is furnished by the fact that the brain responses of vege-
tative state patients to other kinds of stimuli (sounds, words, semantic ambiguity, own name,
etc.) have temporal dynamics of the same order as the responses in normals and certainly do not
show the sustained activation found in response to the imagery instruction.
8 Voluntary agency typically produces transient activation of ventrolateral prefrontal cortex that
can be detected by event-related fMRI (making a choice, performing a mental action, changing
task rules). Although Owen et al. did not analyse the fMRI data from their patient to see if this
‘signature of volition’ was present, doing so would have been very interesting, as it could have a
signiﬁcant bearing on the volitional interpretation of the patient’s response.
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she had not suffered functional or structural lesion of the motor pathway?’
The question is a fair one, but it could do with some development. We might
put the objection as follows. Assume, for the sake of reductio, that the patient
intentionally imagined playing tennis and walking around her home. It seems
to follow from this that she ought to have been able to form various beha-
vioural intentions, such as the intention to actually play tennis, walk around
the home, or simply get out of bed. And if she could form behavioural inten-
tions, then she would have executed them had she been motivated to do so
(which she clearly would have been). Since she didn’t execute any behavioural
intentions, we must conclude that she couldn’t form any intentions at all and
hence did not intentionally imagine playing tennis.
One response to this objection is to take issue with the assumption that
someone who is able to form intentions to perform various acts of mental im-
agery will also be able to form intentions to perform various motor actions. It
is possible that intention has a somewhat modular structure and that the abil-
ity to form intentions can be selectively impaired. Of some relevance to this
case is the fact that patients with Parkinson’s disease can construct stimulus-
driven intentions but not endogenous intentions (Jahanshahi and Frith
[1998]). A second account of why the patient might not have been able to en-
gage in intentional motor acts is that she has suffered lesions of the motor
pathway, pace Naccache’s assumption. Although we have no information
about the motor pathways in this particular patient, independent information
about vegetative state patients affords this proposal some plausibility. As
Coleman et al. ([2007]. p. 36) remark, ‘…A large number of patients pro-
gressing to the vegetative stage also suffer complex peripheral nervous
system changes. Many have extensive contractures, limited range of move-
ment and muscle wastage preventing sufﬁcient motor output to respond to
command’ (see also Kinney and Samuels [1994]). So, although Naccache’s
question is a good one, it can be satisfactorily answered.
This brings us back to the issue of automaticity. In a very interesting dis-
cussion of this case, Levy ([2008]) takes issue with the claim that volition is
evidence of consciousness. Levy points out that there is a large literature with-
in both clinical and social psychology which suggests that action can occur
independently of consciousness. For example, giving subjects stimuli that
prime for thoughts of old age leads them to walk more slowly than control
subjects (Bargh et al. [1996]; see also Dijksterhuis and Van Knippenberg
[1998]). Automatic mirroring, in which subjects unwittingly modulate their
actions or the syntax of their speech to match that of others, is also wide-
spread (see Bargh and Chartrand [1999]). To these ﬁndings, we might add
others from cognitive neuroscience showing that online motor control can
be guided (Milner and Goodale [2006]) or modiﬁed (Lau and Passingham
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[2007]) by information of which the subject is not conscious. Don’t these re-
sults cast doubt on the argument from volition?
We think not. Firstly, we should distinguish automatic, overlearned actions
from less familiar action types. Even if we can execute highly routinised ac-
tions unconsciously, it is doubtful that we can execute relatively novel types of
action unconsciously. Are the actions that this patient is taken to have execut-
ed routinised or novel? Well, they may not have been completely novel, but it
is unlikely that the patient will have spent much time imagining walking
around her house or playing tennis in response to spoken instructions. We
very much doubt that we could imagine playing tennis or visiting the rooms
in our house without paying attention to what we were doing. William James
noted that consciousness tends to depart from where it is not needed, but it
would seem to be very much needed here.
Secondly, even when automatic actions are executed unconsciously, the
stimuli that trigger them are typically conscious. One might not be conscious
of initiating, guiding, or completing the action, but one will usually be aware
of the environmental feature to which one is automatically responding. Think
of the infamous long-distance truck driver who navigates ‘on autopilot’. The
driver might not be aware of making adjustments to the steering, but she will
typically be aware of the features of her environment (the road, the stop signs,
the trafﬁc lights, and so on) that motivate such adjustments. (Of course, the
awareness of these features might leave few traces in episodic memory.) This
point has a direct bearing on experimental work relating to high-level priming
in social psychology. Even where the experimental subjects are unaware that
their behaviour is affected by the critical stimuli, they are aware of the stimuli
themselves.9 Relating these thoughts to the present case, one might suggest
that even if the patient is not conscious of carrying out certain acts of imagery,
she might nonetheless be conscious of the verbal instruction that she has been
given and perhaps also of the images that she is manipulating.
Thirdly, the argument from volition is not meant to be demonstrative. We
are not claiming that imagery responses of this kind could never be produced
unconsciously; indeed, we aren’t even claiming that it is impossible to produce
responses of this kind in unconscious adult human beings. Our claim is only
that a response of this kind is good evidence of consciousness. In sum, we think
9 These data suggest that a useful further test would be to see if vegetative state patients can follow
a two-stage instruction. For example, they could be asked, “when you hear this tone ___, switch
back and forth between imagining playing tennis and imagining walking around your home”.
Even if the reaction to the instruction to “imagine playing tennis” and to “now just relax” could
be voluntary but unconscious, it is much less plausible that following a two-stage instruction
triggered by a neutral tone could be an act of voluntary unconsciousness. Although more de-
manding than the imagery test alone, such two-stage instructions would probably be
considerably less demanding (and so a less conservative test) than using imagery to communicate
in the way that Owen and colleagues have suggested.
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that the argument from volition provides fairly strong evidence of conscious-
ness in this vegetative state patient: it is reasonable to take the patient’s BOLD
response as evidence of (non-routine) volition, and it is reasonable to take
(non-routine) volition as evidence of consciousness.
Let us summarise the argument of this section. Working within the conﬁnes
of the standard approach, the fMRI data produced by Owen and colleagues
can be interpreted in terms of reportability or in terms of volition. The argu-
ment from reportability cannot be sustained, but the argument from volition
has some force insofar as the execution of non-routine actions provides us with
strong prima facie evidence of consciousness. This prima facie evidence would
be defeated if we were to regard reportability as necessary for consciousness,
but there is little reason to endorse that position. Even if reportability were the
sine qua non of consciousness in normal healthy human subjects (which we
doubt), vegetative state patients clearly fall outside that category.
We have argued that volition-based considerations suggest that this patient
was conscious, but these considerations are clearly not decisive. Further, the
fact that some vegetative state patients show covert evidence of voluntary be-
haviour in the absence of any overt evidence of volition surely gives additional
urgency to the question of whether those vegetative state patients who show
no sign of volition, or indeed are incapable of volition at all, might also be
conscious. This leads us directly to the question of whether there are other
forms of evidence that could bear on the question of consciousness in vegeta-
tive state patients. The force of this question is not restricted to vegetative
state patients, for we might hope to have independent measures of conscious-
ness to verify the bedside measures that are used to determine consciousness in
the MCS patient. To address these questions, we need to go beyond the stan-
dard approach. Exactly how to do that is the topic of the next section.
4 The Natural Kind Methodology
In everyday cases, we rely on broad functional criteria such as report and voli-
tional activity to determine the distribution of consciousness. When faced with
puzzling cases, as with disorders of consciousness, it is tempting to restrict our
attention to the search for evidence of these functional capacities. As we have
seen, the results of such an investigation can be illuminating, but they will often
be less than decisive—as indeed they are in this case. In light of that, one might
wish for additional measures of consciousness. Can we go beyond our pre-the-
oretical measures of consciousness, and, if so, how?10
According to one inﬂuential line of thought, when it comes to ascribing con-
sciousness, we are terminally constrained by the measures that we pre-
10 Farah ([2008]) also discusses this issue.
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theoretically associate with consciousness (Chalmers [1996], p. 243). These
measures need not be taken individually as gold-standards of consciousness,
but as a group they limn the marks by means of which consciousness can be
ascribed. On this view, the existence of consciousness in any vegetative state
patient who was incapable of meeting any of these pre-theoretical criteria
would be forever outside of our ken—a mere theoretical possibility.
This approach to the ascription of consciousness might be appropriate if
consciousness were a nominal kind, akin to (say) dirt. There is no underlying
nature to dirt, and it makes little sense to suppose that something might have
the appearance of dirt without really being dirt. But suppose that conscious-
ness is a natural rather than a nominal kind. Suppose, in other words, that
being conscious is more like having hepatitis C than being dirty. There is
an underlying nature to hepatitis C that goes beyond the superﬁcial properties
with which the concept may be associated. In medicine, clinicians gather signs
of a disease and then examine whether they are ‘syndromic’—whether they
seem to be found together better than chance. If so, the search is on for an
underlying pathology that explains the syndrome. What was initially charac-
terised as a blood-borne virus (non-A, non-B) that caused hepatitis is now
known to be a speciﬁc virus, hepatitis C (Choo et al. [1989]). Importantly, this
form of viral hepatitis was diagnosed and treated before there was any sureﬁre
or gold standard way of telling whether a patient was infected with the hep-
atitis C virus. Tests of liver inﬂammation, together with the clinical history
and exclusion of other causes, gave a good indication, but were not determi-
native. Now, sequencing for viral RNA directly gives a highly accurate
diagnosis. However, having strong evidence for the existence of an underlying
natural property does not depend on there ever being a sureﬁre gold standard
test.
In many cases where a variety of everyday signs cluster together, there is
indeed a natural property that gives rise to the pre-theoretic ways we have
of characterising the phenomenon (e.g., being H2O gives rise to characteristics
like being liquid, transparent, etc.). In such cases, it is possible to discover in-
stances of that natural property which are incapable of meeting any of our
pre-theoretic criteria (e.g., water in the atmosphere of some distant planet).
Finding an apparent cluster of properties does not guarantee that there will
be a natural property which explains the clustering (a natural kind property),
but when the clustering is best explained by a natural kind property, we there-
by have the means to go beyond our pre-theoretic ways of characterising the
phenomenon through picking out the natural kind in new ways. If conscious-
ness were a natural kind, it would be very surprising to discover that our
access to it was limited to the pre-theoretical measures that we associate with
it. In every other case, discovering a natural kind property allows us to go
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beyond our pre-theoretic measures. We see no good reason why consciousness
cannot be investigated in the same way.
We call this the ‘natural kind methodology’. The methodology involves col-
lecting a wide variety of evidence for the target property across a range of
different cases and looking for ‘nomological clusters’ in this evidence:
Nomological cluster
A set of evidential properties Ti form a nomological cluster iff:
(1) they are instantiated together better than chance (given background the-
ory) and
(2) observing subsets of the cluster supports induction to other elements of
the cluster.
The existence of a nomological cluster can be explained by there being a nat-
ural property that is responsible, causally or constitutively, for the fact that
these measures are positively associated with each other. Not only is the instan-
tiation of a natural property an explanation of the cluster, in the kinds of cases
we are considering here it is likely to be the best explanation. That natural prop-
erty may be the property of being conscious or it may be the more determinate
property of being conscious in some particular way (e.g., being perceptually
conscious, being visually conscious, or being conscious of redness). When there
is a reason why the properties over which we induce cluster together we can say
that they form a natural kind. The property in virtue of which they so cluster is
also called a natural kind or natural kind property.
There are two broad conceptions of natural kinds in philosophy (Mellor
[1974]; Schwartz [1980]; Sterelny [1983]). Some restrict the term to a Lockean
conception in which some inner intrinsic essence is responsible for the identi-
ﬁable symptoms (Putnam [1975]). That would exclude cases where the
property explaining the cluster was extrinsic. For example, the property of
being a member of a given biological species is partly an historical property,
with similarities in surface properties explained by the fact that conspeciﬁc
individuals are related by a process of descent, involving conservative copying
of features, from the very same individual (i.e., by being members of the same
clade). We are adopting a much broader conception of natural kinds, accord-
ing to which any property that supports induction as a result of nomological
principles or natural laws counts as a natural kind (Hacking [1991]; Grifﬁths
[1997]; Millikan [2000]).
For a physical property to be a natural kind is a matter of degree, depend-
ing upon how broad and various are the properties over which it supports
inductions. The natural kind methodology is appropriate no matter where
consciousness falls on this spectrum. It is important that it should be a phys-
ical property that supports a range of inductions, but it doesn’t matter what
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sort of property is founding those inductions. Some distinguish natural prop-
erties, which support inductions for a natural reason, from natural kinds, which
support a wide range of inductions (i.e., are causally or constitutively related to
a large cluster of properties; Bird and Tobin [2009]). The property of being pos-
itively charged applies to a very large variety of things, from the positron up to
the sun,11 and those objects share only a very limited number of other proper-
ties in virtue of being positively charged. The more kind-like consciousness is
the easier will be the task of ﬁnding nomological clusters of properties
connected to it. Correlatively, if being conscious supports only a very narrow
range of inductions then the methodology we recommend will be correspond-
ingly more difﬁcult, even if being conscious is a perfectly natural property.
The prevailing approach in consciousness research is to look for some prop-
erty of experimental subjects that is distinctive of consciousness. Many
paradigms look for a correlate of being conscious in a particular way (being
‘F-ly conscious’), for example of consciously seeing a brieﬂy presented black
ring versus not. Others look for correlates of being globally conscious versus
being unconscious (which correlates with things like the operation of the retic-
ular activating system). Many of these tests may be carried over, piecemeal, to
vegetative state patients. But that would be to miss a crucial part of the natural
kind methodology, which is to establish that the tests really do identify a com-
mon underlying natural property. To do that, we need to see if the tests form a
nomological cluster: that subjects who are conscious according to some test T1
are also conscious according to T2, etc. and that those who are not conscious
according to T1 are not conscious according to T2, and so on with the other
putative tests. Since each of these inferences is defeasible, we should not expect
perfect agreement amongst the tests, but all the inference to the existence of a
common natural property requires is that they are associated.
Existing consciousness research contains a multitude of tests that could
proﬁtably be combined in the search for a nomological cluster.12 For example,
subjects appear to be insensitive to the automatic stem completion effect only
when they are conscious of the relevant stimulus (Debner and Jacoby [1994];
Merikle et al. [2001]). The susceptibility of a subjects’ grip width to a size con-
trast effect seems also to require consciousness of the object being reached for
(Hu and Goodale [2000]). Many other functional tests are candidates, such as
those which our initial gross functional tests suggest either require conscious-
ness or are performed in a different way when the subject is conscious, so that
the mechanism deployed when performing the task when relying on conscious
states has a different functional signature from the non-conscious mechanism
11 To use an example of Alexander Bird’s.
12 The tests needn’t be simply conjunctive; for example, it could be that T1 is a good test of the
presence of consciousness when T2 is also satisﬁed, but not when it is not—all sorts of logical
relations are possible.
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for performing the task. As well as such non-obvious functional properties,
more direct measures of brain properties are relevant and portable to vege-
tative state patients: gamma-band neural synchrony, activation of a global
workspace integrating perceptual areas with prefrontal cortex, existence of
cortico-thalamic loops, locally recurrent processing within cortex, and so
on. None of these tests has yet received widespread acceptance as a good
neural correlate of consciousness, but the natural kind methodology will
help to choose between them.
There are two crucial features of the natural kind approach that we want to
draw attention to. Firstly, it allows us to identify tests for consciousness that
go beyond the superﬁcial tests with which we begin. As the natural kind meth-
od starts to pay off, it will provide us with new measures of consciousness.
Secondly, from the perspective of the natural kind methodology, the everyday
(‘gross’) functional roles that are roughly correlated with consciousness lose
their privileged epistemic status. If other tests are found to correlate closely
with what we take to be conscious versus unconscious states, and with one
another, then these too will be good evidence for consciousness. We will then
face the question of how to weigh the evidential force of these new tests
against that of the everyday functional tests with which we started. Once it
is just a matter of gathering and validating various kinds of evidence, all man-
ner of evidence will, in principle, be admissible: non-obvious functional
properties (certain kinds of susceptibility to priming can indicate that the sub-
ject was not conscious of the stimulus), functional properties that can only be
elicited by special means (e.g., transcranial magnetic stimulation), and evi-
dence of non-functional physical properties of the subject, like neural
structures, cytology, connectivity and activation.
Although some of these tests may not be applicable in the context of dis-
puted cases, others will be. Here is the sort of test that could be used in
vegetative state patients. There are two different ways of forming an associa-
tion between a tone and a puff of air to the eye so that the tone comes to cause
an eye blink: ‘delay conditioning’ and ‘trace conditioning’. In delay condition-
ing a puff of air to the eye is administered during the occurrence of a tone
(after the start of the tone, hence ‘delay’ conditioning); in contrast, in trace
conditioning, the air puff occurs shortly after the tone has stopped. Evidence
from normals suggests that trace conditioning requires consciousness of the
contingency between tone and air puff, whereas delay conditioning does not
(Clark et al. [2002]; Perruchet [1985]). If some vegetative state patients show
eye blink trace conditioning, that would suggest that they have become con-
sciously aware of the contingency. Conversely, if delay conditioning is
preserved in a vegetative state patient but trace conditioning is impaired, that
would be evidence that the patient was not conscious of the tone, the puff of
air and/or the contingency between them.
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Other tests of whether the subject is conscious give rise to direct measures of
brain activity. Experiments on the attentional blink have revealed a brain ac-
tivation signature that correlates with subjects reporting that they see the
stimulus (detecting electrical activity on the scalp with ﬁne-grained temporal
resolution via event-related potential, ERP: Shapiro et al. [1997]; Sergent et al.
[2005]). Similarly, the ‘ignition effect’ is potentially portable to the context of
vegetative state (stimuli are brieﬂy presented, followed by a mask, and when
the presentation is long enough that subjects report the stimuli to be con-
scious, a qualitatively different brain response is observed: Dehaene et al.
[2003]). Schnakers et al. ([2008]) recently reported the use of another ERP test
directly on vegetative state subjects. Hearing one’s own name produces a large
brain response, but in healthy controls what is called the P3 component of the
ERP response is larger when subjects have been asked actively to count oc-
currences of their name than when they listen passively. Schnakers et al.
observed a similar difference between active and passive conditions in four-
teen MCS patients but found no difference in the eight vegetative state
patients that they tested. If such a test were validated by ﬁnding that it corre-
lates with other tests of consciousness across a range of different
circumstances, then its absence in this group of vegetative state patients would
be evidence that this group did not include any patients that were conscious
when tested (which would be unsurprising given that the evidence so far sug-
gests that at best only a small subset of vegetative state patients are conscious).
Certain tests of being globally conscious—of being conscious as such—will
also be possible in vegetative state patients. An example is the way that the
increased activation of language areas produced by high-ambiguity sentences
is abolished by anaesthesia (mentioned above). First, we need to ask if this test
clusters together with other putative tests of consciousness: e.g., is the ‘ignition
effect’ also abolished by anaesthesia and other states of impaired conscious-
ness like sleep? If so, ﬁnding such modulations in a vegetative state patient
would be further evidence that that patient was conscious. We are not suggest-
ing that it would be necessary to anaesthetise vegetative state patients, but
subjects do sometimes fall asleep in the scanner. It seems likely that the
task-speciﬁc activations found by Boly et al. ([2007]) in healthy volunteers
would be abolished by sleep—it would be useful to check. The same test could
be performed in vegetative state patients.13 We predict that they, too, would
fail to show task-speciﬁc activation when asleep. If so, that would provide fur-
ther evidence that a subject was indeed conscious when awake and exhibiting
task-speciﬁc activation like the SMA response to the tennis instruction.
13 Behavioural, physiological and even EEG markers could be used to tell when subjects are
asleep (subject to technical difﬁculties of concurrent measurement with fMRI, especially of
the fMRI–EEG combination).
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To the extent that we already have some reason to believe that current tests
of consciousness form a nomological cluster, two features of the fMRI data
offer some direct evidence that the patient was conscious: the areas involved
and its time course. Although the patient’s pattern of activation in the tennis/
house visual imagery task matched those in conscious healthy volunteers, it is
not yet clear to what extent the same areas can be activated in unconscious
subjects or subliminally in conscious subjects. In particular, unconscious ac-
tivation of the PPA may be possible. But if it turns out that SMA is rarely
(if ever) unconsciously activated, then that would be evidence that those veg-
etative state patients who show matching activation are conscious. Evidence
about the areas involved in the semantic ambiguity task would have similar
force. The fact that both the imagery and the semantic ambiguity effects are
found only in a small number of vegetative state patients lends further support
to their utility as tests which could discriminate amongst vegetative state pa-
tients, identifying that subset who are conscious.
Secondly, as we have already noted, Owen and colleagues found that the
BOLD signal in response to the imagery instructions was sustained through-
out the thirty-second block up until the point when the instruction to rest was
given.14 They invoked these data as evidence that the patient was performing
a voluntary action (and hence was conscious), but these data can also be em-
ployed within the natural kind methodology. Brain activation associated with
subliminally presented stimuli in conscious subjects lasts on the order of
hundreds of milliseconds or less, so ﬁnding a sustained pattern of task-speciﬁc
brain activation in a healthy subject would certainly suggest that the subject
was conscious in relation to some function performed by that brain network.
The inference is weakened by the fact that we are dealing with patients who
have suffered severe brain damage, and it is always possible that the brain
damage substantially alters the time course of brain activity, but the fact re-
mains that time course data are an important source of direct evidence that
this patient was conscious.
An important component of the natural kind methodology is the task of
separating out confounding variables. For example, that a test is abolished
by sleep may be due to one of the many other differences between sleep
and wakefulness other than those that concern consciousness. Accounts of
the functional role of consciousness typically focus on consciousness in the
context of normal wakefulness, but we need to somehow screen off the role
played by wakefulness—as opposed to that played by consciousness—in such
conditions. Similarly, we need to know how putative tests cluster and disso-
14 As we noted above, the latter part of the thirty-second block has not been analysed separately.
If this were done, it might provide stronger support for the claim that the patient was
performing a voluntary action.
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ciate in other kinds of pathology where we have good reason to think that
consciousness is still present (e.g., Parkinson’s, Alzheimer’s, epilepsy). The full
picture can include a huge range of evidence: developmental data in infants
and children, studies in other animals, and so on. We don’t need to wait for all
these data to be in before we can begin to make better inferences about con-
sciousness and its absence in vegetative state. The ﬁrst step is just to look at
how a small cluster of individually well-validated tests cluster together across
a narrow range of cases (awake, asleep, anaesthetised) in healthy controls, in
vegetative state patients, and in some clearly conscious patient group with rel-
evant pathology (e.g., recovered vegetative state patients or those vegetative
state patients who do achieve communication via BOLD response).
5 Is Consciousness a Special Case?
The natural kind methodology is routine in science, so it is somewhat surpris-
ing that consciousness research has not adopted it. What might explain this
fact? One possibility is that consciousness is not best thought of as a natural
kind (Section 5.1). Another possibility is that although consciousness is in fact
a natural kind, it possesses certain features that prevent the natural kind meth-
odology from being usefully applied to it (Section 5.2).
5.1 Is consciousness a natural kind?
Certain theorists have suggested that ‘consciousness’ is a catch-all label for a
variety of loosely related phenomena as opposed to a natural kind term
(Churchland [1983]; Dennett [1988]; Rey [1983]; Wilkes [1988]). We have
some sympathy with the claim that the ordinary notion of consciousness
picks out a number of different phenomena (phenomenal consciousness, self-
consciousness, access consciousness, etc.), but these worries do not undermine
the narrower project of investigating phenomenal consciousness as a natural
kind. In fact, the natural kind methodology requires only that there are natural
kinds corresponding to what we pre-theoretically think of as determinates of
phenomenal consciousness, such as perceptual experience, visual experience,
and so on. It is, of course, an empirical question whether there is a nomological
cluster associated with any one of these determinates, but the evidence to date
provides the proponent of a natural kind analysis of these notions with reasons
for optimism.
A closely related worry is that consciousness is really a nominal kind—that a
full conceptual analysis of ‘consciousness’ reveals that reportability, or volun-
tary agency, or some combination of the two is constitutive of consciousness.
We won’t rehearse here the arguments against this kind of analytic function-
alism, for we are assuming that this position is false rather than setting out to
refute it. However, our discussion of the standard approach to studying con-
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sciousness in Section 3 above does show some of the limitations that derive
from tying consciousness tightly to any particular set of pre-theoretical criteria.
Further concerns about the natural kind methodology derive from the
thought that consciousness comes in degrees. If this were the case, then the ex-
istence of borderline cases would be unavoidable built into the basic ontology
of the phenomenon. The answer to this worry is that the natural kind method-
ology is applicable in any event. The scientiﬁc method has proved itself adept
at dealing with properties that come in degrees, even managing to quantify
them in many cases (e.g., mass). Of course, if consciousness is a graded prop-
erty, then it may support relatively few inductions, which would indeed make it
difﬁcult to investigate. At the same time, the fact that a natural property comes
in degrees can sharpen the reliability and increase the variety of inductions that
it can support, especially if the property in question can be quantiﬁed. Whether
consciousness can be quantiﬁed is also a question for empirical investigation,
but it is a question that the natural kind methodology is adequate to address.
Further reasons for doubting that consciousness is a natural kind derive
from the thought that consciousness is multiply-realisable. Suppose, the critic
might say, that consciousness can be realised by different physical structures
and in different cognitive architectures. If that is so, then how can we use phys-
ical and functional measures with which consciousness happens to be
associated in us—measures that might not be essential to consciousness as
such—as a guide to the presence of consciousness?
The question is a good one, but it needs to be handled with some care.
Worries about multiple realisability have most force when we are dealing with
creatures that are very different from us, such as Martians, robots, or even
octopuses. In such cases, the natural kind methodology will be extremely dif-
ﬁcult to apply (Block [2002]). But such worries have far less force in this
context for vegetative state patients are fellow human beings with whom we
share physiological and ﬁne-grained functional properties. There is good rea-
son to think that functional and non-functional properties which cluster
together in some members of the species (in oneself, for example) also do so
in other members of the species, given our shared relation of descent with con-
servative copying from a single common ancestor in the relatively recent past
(Sober [2000]). Consciousness may be multiply-realisable, but when it comes
to the members of a single species it is unlikely to be multiply realised.
Of course, it is possible that consciousness is realised in a sui generis way in
vegetative state, but it seems highly unlikely that the physical–functional basis
of consciousness in vegetative state should stand apart from that in all other
normal and pathological brains, including those of recovered vegetative state
patients. The natural kind approach would also be in difﬁculty if putative
tests of consciousness clustered in healthy subjects but not in vegetative state
patients. Then, we would need to have recourse to a much larger research
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project investigating whether the tests cluster in a range of other pathologies,
and in infants, and in other animals, and so on. That would take us beyond the
scope of the present paper. We are not claiming that the natural kind approach
is guaranteed to deliver a correct and determinate answer to the question of
whether vegetative state patients are conscious, only that it has good prospects
of doing so.
A rather different worry with the natural kind conception of consciousness
is that it appears to be at odds with the epistemic authority we possess
concerning our own states of consciousness. A phenomenally conscious state
is simply a state that there is ‘something it is like’ to be in. But ‘what it’s like-
ness’ is, one might think, a ‘self-revealing’ or ‘luminous’ property in the sense
that its presence or absence is directly ascertainable from the ﬁrst-person per-
spective. Natural kind properties, by contrast, have an underlying structure
that is not immediately apparent. In short, the worry is that the natural kind
conception of consciousness appears to threaten the appealing thought that
we are authorities when it comes to our own states of consciousness.
We certainly have no wish to jettison ﬁrst-person authority with respect to
consciousness. Luckily, we have no need to do so, for the apparent tension
between that authority and the natural kind conception is merely apparent.
The objection goes wrong in assuming that being a natural kind need be a
matter of microstructure. Consider another natural kind property, such as be-
ing a polar bear. If two animals both possess polar bear-ness (i.e., the property
of being a polar bear), then there is indeed no further question of whether they
are polar bears—irrespective of their underlying microstructure. Since ‘what
it’s likeness’ is the phenomenon we are setting out to investigate, it would be a
mistake to assume that it must be a superﬁcial property, separate from the
natural kind which is consciousness.
In this section we have canvassed a number of objections to the natural
kind conception of consciousness and have argued that none of these objec-
tions is decisive. However, even if consciousness is a natural kind, one might
worry that standard natural kind methodology cannot be applied when the
investigation must start with the evidence furnished by subjects’ reports. We
turn now to such worries.
5.2 A special obstacle?
In order to generate the set of tests that form our putative nomological cluster,
we have to start somewhere. The science of consciousness starts with subjects’
reports: introspective reports of their own experiential states and environmen-
tal reports in contexts where asking the subjects afterwards (and being subjects
themselves) makes the researchers fairly sure that such environmental reports
reﬂect the relevant phenomenal states. Given this starting point, additional
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tests of consciousness—for example, neural signatures of various kinds—look
to be evidence of consciousness only insofar as they are evidence of the ability
to report. So, the challenge is this: given that the whole method is parasitic on
report, wouldn’t it be paradoxical to arrive at a test that could tell us that a
subject was phenomenally conscious, although we thought their phenomenal
states were no longer reportable? If further tests are only ever evidence of con-
sciousness because they are evidence of reportability, which is itself evidence
of consciousness, then we cannot ever really have measures of consciousness
that are independent of the pre-theoretical criteria with which we begin.
The challenge would be legitimate if phenomenal consciousness were a
nominal kind, deﬁned at least in part in terms of reportability. But once
our objector has come with us to the point of accepting that phenomenal con-
sciousness may be a natural kind, then this challenge loses its force: if there is a
property that explains the cluster of tests, including reportability, then there is
no reason to think of tests in the cluster as being indirect tests of conscious-
ness. There is indeed an inference, along the lines we discussed in Section 3,
from a correlative test, via reportability, to consciousness: that they are evi-
dence of evidence of consciousness. Once we have evidence that there is indeed
a natural kind property underlying the cases that we pre-theoretically took to
be instances of consciousness, the fact that those initial instances happened to
be generated in a particular way (e.g., by report) presents no obstacle to what
we can subsequently discover about them. If one accepts that phenomenal
consciousness is a natural kind, there is no reason to think that the natural
kind methodology poses any sui generis obstacle to the investigation of con-
sciousness by the third-person methods of science.
Deep puzzles remain, which arise out of the fact that we are each subjects of
conscious experience. In this paper, we don’t take ourselves to be answering
the hard problem or bridging the explanatory gap between ﬁrst-person and
third-person data about consciousness. Indeed, the existence of this explana-
tory gap may be part of what explains the reluctance of those engaged in the
science of consciousness to dive in with their standard methods. The fact that
we have direct ﬁrst-personal acquaintance with phenomenal consciousness
might itself contribute to the widespread reluctance to treat consciousness
as suitable target of the natural kind methodology. Forceful as those psycho-
logical motivations undoubtedly are, they lose their bite when the project is to
improve our third-personal theories of the phenomenon and to reason about
its presence and absence in others in the ordinary abductive way.
6 Conclusion
According to the standard approach to the study of consciousness, conscious-
ness is uniquely identiﬁed by high-level measures such as reportability and
The Vegetative State and the Science of Consciousness 479
 at O
xford University on Septem
ber 10, 2010
bjps.oxfordjournals.org
D
ow
nloaded from
 
voluntary behaviour. Commitment to the standard approach leads theorists to
assume that evidence of consciousness in disorders of consciousness such as
vegetative state must take the indirect form of ﬁnding neural evidence that
the criteria of reportability and volition have indeed been met, albeit in a co-
vert or private form. As we have seen, this approach does indeed suggest that
certain vegetative state patients might be conscious, although the evidence
here is far from conclusive.
Our central aim here has not been to assess consciousness in vegetative state
by reference to the standard approach but to argue that the standard approach
is by no means compulsory. The natural kind methodology that we have out-
lined provides a superior framework within which consciousness can be
studied, and this framework promises to prove particularly useful when study-
ing members of our own species. In line with the sciences of other biological
phenomena (such as diseases), the science of consciousness should proceed by
looking for clusters of properties—both functional and physical—that support
induction between elements of the cluster. This approach allows us to count as
direct evidence of consciousness neural and functional properties that are not
pre-theoretically associated with consciousness. There is no guarantee that this
method will deliver deﬁnitive answers to the question of consciousness in veg-
etative state patients, but on the reasonable assumption that (phenomenal)
consciousness is indeed a natural property, it does offer some reason for opti-
mism on that score.
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